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NATIONAL REVIEW

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June 20, 1956

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

The Air Race:

Are We at Moscow's Mercy?

ALEXANDER P. DE SEVERSKY

L. BRENT BOZELL

AN EDITORIAL

What Individualism Is Not

FRANK CHODOROV

Articles and Reviews by JOHN CHAMBERLAIN
C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS • F. A. VOIGT • E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN
RICHARD M. WEAVER • FRANK S. MEYER • WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.



from WASHINGTON *straight*

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

Case Not Closed

Richard L. Hanson *et al.*, against whom the Supreme Court ruled in its recent decision upholding compulsory unionism, have petitioned the Court to stay the issuance of its mandate in the case. The Court's decision, the appellees contend, "was based on arguments . . . raised in this case for the first time by the Court, or . . . made by appellants' [Rwy. Employees Dept., AFL, *et al.*] counsel at earlier stages of this litigation but later abandoned by them..."

Defection in Illinois

There is considerable significance in the fact that the Illinois state Democratic convention refused to endorse Adlai Stevenson as a Presidential candidate. The convention also decided not to bind delegates-at-large to vote as a unit. Former Governor John Stelle declared that at least fifteen to twenty of Illinois' 78-member delegation were openly opposed to the renomination of Stevenson. In private conversation many of the delegates indicated a preference for Senator Symington of Missouri.

No Airlift for Wiley

The Eisenhower Administration took Democratic Senator George off the hook of almost certain defeat by giving him an international post. Another internationalist, and former Senate Foreign Relations Chairman, Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, who always carried the hod for Mr. Eisenhower, is in equally serious trouble, but the White House has given no indication of any intention to relieve his pain. Mr. Wiley accuses his colleague Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of contributing to his probability of defeat, and Mr. McCarthy says, "It's a pleasure."

As it Looks Now

Barring another heart attack or a first class depression, Ike is in like Flynn. That is the considered view of the professional Democratic politicians. But they have high hopes of continuing their control of Congress. Preliminary surveys indicate that the Republicans may lose twenty to thirty seats in the House, mostly from agricultural districts. In the Senate, however, the GOP is in some quarters given a chance of regaining control.

And About Time

To implement recommendations of the Hoover Commission, Senators Kennedy and Payne have introduced a bill to set up businesslike methods of accounting in the government. Some accountants estimate that this reform could lead to an eventual saving of four billion dollars a year. This is only one of the sixteen proposals which the Administration is urging Congress to enact.

Adjournment

Congress should get away by mid-July. The House has passed twelve major appropriations bills, and the Senate has passed five. Two more money bills must be taken up by the House, one to make supplementary funds available, the other to finance the foreign aid program. The Senate has still to act on Social Security amendments. The compromise highway construction bill will reach both Houses for final action in the near future. The leadership will have to decide whether to bring up federal aid to schools, civil rights and the bill establishing American participation in world tariff agreement. All of these measures are highly controversial, and it is extremely doubtful that they will be taken up.

Universal Military Training

In a recent speech at Syracuse, House Republican Leader Joe Martin of Massachusetts said that the military reserve system program "is a success." If he is over-optimistic it is a certainty that the President will renew his request for authority to draft young men into the reserves. This would meet congressional resistance.

Tribute

France has signed an agreement with Morocco giving it full control over its own foreign affairs. As a consequence the United States will have to make a deal with Morocco to maintain five of its most important foreign military bases. We have invested more than 400 million dollars in these bases since the signing of a secret agreement with France in 1950. Morocco was not consulted in that "deal" and now takes the position that America will have to renegotiate for the privilege of maintaining air bases. As usual, we will come to terms with the customary fee for appeasement.

NATIONAL REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

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The WEEK

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NATIONAL REVIEW is published weekly at Orange, Conn. by
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Weekly, Inc. Second-class mail privileges authorized at Orange, Conn.

EDITORIAL AND SUBSCRIPTION OFFICES:

211 East 37 St.

New York 16, N. Y.

Telephone: MUrray Hill 2-0941

RATES: Twenty cents a copy, \$7.00 a year, \$13.00 for two years.
Foreign, \$9.00 a year; Canada, \$8.00 a year.

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less return postage, or better, a stamped self-addressed envelope is
enclosed. Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily
represent the views of the editors.

● Interrupting its spring trend toward the liquida-
tion of the states, the Supreme Court has denied an
appeal of the United Automobile Workers against a
Wisconsin court order restraining the union's use of
mass picketing, violence and threats against the Koh-
ler Company. The UAW claimed that the Taft-Hartley
Act pre-empted the field of labor legislation for Con-
gress, but the Court ruled that "the dominant interest
of the state in preventing violence and property dam-
age cannot be questioned." Chief Justice Warren, and
two others, dissented.

● Premier Guy Mollet has survived last week's con-
fidence test in the Chamber of Deputies by a seem-
ingly safe (271-56) margin. Two hundred and one depu-
ties, among them 144 Communists who could have
brought the score to 271-257, abstained from voting.
Angry as they are at Mollet's tough Algerian policy,
the Communists cannot be counted on to abstain next
time. Three months ago, in another Assembly test on
Algeria, Mollet received 455 votes.

● In a gesture of Old World courtesy to an honored
guest, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who had been prom-
inently associated with the former anti-Tito operation,
resigned as Soviet Foreign Minister the day before
Marshal Tito made his glittering arrival in Moscow.
His replacement, presumably selected with Marshal
Tito's sensibilities in mind, is *Pravda's* editor, Dmitri
Shepilov, whom Stewart Alsop recalls from an inter-
view a few months back as "a hard-driving, ruthless,
fiercely ambitious . . . man" who "really and deeply
believes that the Soviet system and the American sys-
tem are inherently and totally hostile, and that the
only possible outcome must be and will be the utter
destruction of the American system."

● Labor unions are adroitly working to muster sup-
port for their opposition to right-to-work legislation.
Their tactics differ markedly from those they used un-
successfully against the Taft-Hartley Law which they
characterized as a venture in tyranny. This time, by
exercising some restraint, the unions are cultivating
prestigious allies. They are basing their case on ap-
peals to morality and on the newly revealed right to
compulsory association. The appeals are backed by
handsome dispensations. The National Council of the

Churches of Christ in 1954 accepted a grant of \$200,000 from the CIO. The Council is now being urged to declare the union shop to be the Word of the Lord.

- Mr. Alex Rose of the United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union, has invited the federal government to take measures to discourage relocation of industry and to penalize municipalities which strive to attract new industries. Specifically, Mr. Rose asked Congress to lift tax exemptions from industrial construction bonds floated by "guilty" municipalities—which he defines as towns or cities which "lure" a factory or mill from a unionized locality through the offer of cheaper labor or lower production costs.

- The Democratic Party does not, in its present condition, wholly satisfy Walter Reuther, who will make his demands on his Party more explicit. "The Democrats," said Mr. Reuther, will not be permitted to "compete with Ike in the middle of the road. The Democratic Party . . . can't face every direction and be all things to all men and expect to get labor support. They haven't satisfied us yet in 1956."

- The Communist Party, asserts a New York joint legislative committee, counts among its agencies of indoctrination a number of summer camps for children, and has long used them for the two-fold purpose of catching converts while young and providing summer jobs for its adult faithful. The Committee laid bare a "long-continued Communist conspiracy, planned and directed by the highest echelons of the party," to exploit the camps. And it vigorously denounced an attempt on the part of the witnesses called to withhold the facts about the ownership, operation and financing of the camps in question.

- U Nu of Burma, virtually admitting the bankruptcy of his eight-year-old neutralist policies, has stepped down as Premier. The Soviet and Communist Chinese embassies in Rangoon have, he says, "sorely embarrassed" him with their propaganda and espionage activities, which, in Burma as everywhere else, have taken a form that no genuine neutral can tolerate.

- The Hungarian Embassy in Vienna flatly denies a report that Cardinal Mindszenty is back in prison for refusing to resume the primacy of the Hungarian Church. The Communists will not agree, however, to let Western newsmen confirm the denial by visiting Mindszenty.

- Several hundred persons have been killed by Premier Nehru's policemen in the past few months in Bombay, where massive protests are being staged against Nehru's proposal to administer Bombay centrally rather than allowing it to incorporate itself

within the Marathi-speaking state. Premier Nehru announced that he would not tolerate violent agitation in the land of satyagraha. He will resist such agitation against his authority by violence.

- A French paper reports that four Communist intellectuals, all members of the Party living in Moscow, were so moved by the campaign against the cult of personalism that they proposed to the government the founding of a second political party. The Party, the French add, promptly expelled them as enemies of the people.

- Under the direction of Professor Arthur Kemp, the third meeting of the Institute on Freedom is in session at Claremont College in California. The meeting, designed to explore the interrelationship of individual liberty and the free economy, is another indication of a revival of academic interest in libertarianism. This year's visiting lecturers include Friedrich Hayek (*The Road to Serfdom*), Aaron Director (*The Problem of Technocracy*), and Herbert Heaton (*Economic History of Europe*).

- In England, during the war, an emergency measure was passed entitling the Minister of Agriculture to seize farmland he deemed to be inefficiently administered by its owners. The measure, so repugnant to a people accustomed to regarding the right to property, particularly to land, as inalienable, got through only on the momentum of the war effort: it was "a wartime emergency power," to be relinquished after "the period of the emergency." Last week, in a period which no one can convincingly call one of immediate crisis, certainly not a period when food is in scarce supply, Lady Garbett, widow of Sir Colin Garbett, and her daughter Susan, were dispossessed of their 163-acre farm, Horam Manor Farm, for insufficiently exploiting it.

- This categorical affirmation of the inseparability of private property and individual freedom was published in New York last week: "If this arbitrary power [to seize property] should be used successfully by the government against those who differ politically, you can toss away all the restraints against autocratic rule contained in the Bill of Rights."—*Daily Worker*, June 4, 1956.

- Even the life of a clown is wearily doctrinaire in satellite Europe, reports Zbigniew Styczek, a Polish clown, who recently escaped to the West. Mr. Styczek reports that he and other professional buffoons in his company were sent to an institute to be schooled in anti-West and anti-capitalist jokes. That was only barely tolerable, he said; but when he found the jokes were not funny, he chose freedom.

Who Is Ahead?

The debate over the national defense policy is confused by a number of factors extraneous to the question whether it is an intelligent and prescient policy, geared to the national interest. There is, first, the yearly overdramatization of needs by every petitioner, a private showing for the benefit of congressional appropriations committees. Then there is the indefatigable search for a political issue, at its peak in a Presidential year. Finally, there is the altogether natural phenomenon of rivalry among coordinate branches of the armed services. A desirable phenomenon in that it moves men to extraordinary efforts to improve their branch of the service, undesirable in that it sometimes leads to unreasoned factionalism.

These factors notwithstanding, the time has come to ask a most serious question: Is the United States adequately armed? In this issue, Mr. Bozell reports on the testimony of General LeMay. He says, in so many words, the United States is not safe, and the situation will get worse, not better. Major Alexander de Seversky sets forth a series of propositions involving the pre-eminence of air power which, if they are correct, indict United States policy.

The tendency has been to dismiss doubts about the sufficiency of the national defense by citing the military experience of the President of the United States; and then staring, with wonderment — perhaps of the same kind his troops directed at Napoleon after Waterloo — at the questioner.

Those military critics who question the adequacy of our defense insist that President Eisenhower is, in military matters, a traditionalist. Eisenhower, they contend, understands the necessity of tanks and machine guns and pill boxes and mortar shells, because that is the kind of war he was most ostensibly involved in. He goes so far as to understand — they say — the tactical usefulness of air power employed in correlation with land and sea operations. But does he, they ask, understand the revolutionary developments in military science that have resulted from our movement into an age of new weapons and weapons carriers — the age of nuclear weapons and jet bombers and intercontinental guided missiles?

Those are questions difficult for a layman to answer, particularly a layman without access to Presidential deliberations on the subject. But this much laymen can say: It is a fact that the President faces intrinsic difficulties — whatever technical shape the national defense takes — that issue from the proposition to which he has tied American policy; to wit, that war is unthinkable.

If war is unthinkable, if the President really be-

lieves what he assured the Soviet leaders face to face in Geneva that he does believe — namely, that the Communists sincerely want peace — then how can he view armament except as a rather formal concession to an elfin improbability, an exercise in superacademic caution?

The point surely is that the Eisenhower Administration is not taking seriously, at least as far as the public can see, signs in the sky that point to an alarming relative increase in the quantity and quality of Soviet airplanes. Demands by Congressmen and publicists for forthright answers to forthright questions meet up with mollifying generalizations about the hair on America's chest. They do not serve to quiet the misgivings that result from reading the words of General LeMay, or seeing moving pictures of Soviet demonstrations in April, or thinking through the analysis of Major de Seversky.

General Eisenhower's responsibility to talk frankly and to interest himself publicly in the state of American defenses is grave in proportion to the blind faith the people repose in his judgment. It may be we are asking him to do what is psychologically impossible for him to do — to treat the armed services as though they might some day come in handy. But however difficult it is to struggle to achieve military superiority hand-in-hand with a policy based on the theoretical impossibility of armed conflict, that superiority must be established. On it — not on effusions of international good will — rest Western hopes for survival and freedom.

We're All Titos Now

Representatives Vorys, Richards and other congressional skeptics do not seem to understand that Tito's visit to Moscow is the greatest triumph for U.S. foreign policy since the surrender of the Reichswehr.

In 1948, the Cominform expelled Tito for minor nationalistic deviations. Our State Department, then under a Democratic Administration, hailed the Tito breach as the solution for all problems and the pattern for the future. Congress was talked into line. A billion dollars worth of economic and military aid flowed to Belgrade. Waves of "inspired" pro-Tito propaganda spread out from Washington.

During eight long, discouraging years, while many impatient critics of American policy hectorred the State Department, not a single additional Tito popped up.

Now, at last, our reward has come. After the long sterility in Warsaw and Bucharest and Sofia and Peiping, it is out of the Moscow hatchery itself that the first new Titos have sprung. Khrushchev-Tito, Bulganin-Tito, Zhukhov-Tito—a whole Presidium of

Kremlin-Titos flung their comradely arms around the original Broz-Tito as his special train rolled into Moscow station.

Marshal Voroshilov-Tito, "on behalf of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet," voiced the official welcome to "dear Comrade President." Comrade President Tito-Tito pronounced his greetings to "dear comrades, leaders of the Soviet Union," and, commenting on the late unpleasantness, guaranteed that "nothing of the kind will ever happen again between the two countries marching along the path of Marx, Engels and Lenin."

So flushed with the new outlook, indeed, are the Kremlin-Titos that they have issued the ukase that all



comrades everywhere, from Prague to New York to Singapore, are to be reborn at once as true-blue, anti-Stalin, back-to-Lenin Titos.

Thus, American foreign policy triumphs. As the end product of the billion dollar pro-Tito operation, the State Department, and most of its critics, would have been ready to settle for a halfway respectable Albanian Tito. Instead it nets the entire Soviet leadership—as if a lion instead of a rabbit had jumped out of a magician's hat.

The vexed question of foreign aid can now be much simplified. The State Department thought it worth while to give Tito a billion dollars for being a Titoist. Since Khrushchev rules fifteen times as many people, it is only reasonable, now that he is a Titoist, to give him fifteen billion; and so on down the line. If Titos are what we want, Comrade Khrushchev will provide them much faster than Secretary Dulles.

The Dialectic

Extracts from Premier Krushchev's speech before the Twentieth Congress:

Stalin practiced brutal violence, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed to his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts . . .

*O great Stalin, O leader of the peoples,
Thou who broughtest man to birth,
Thou who fructifiest the earth,
Thou who restorest the centuries,
Thou who makest bloom the spring,
Thou who makest vibrate the musical chords.
Thou, splendor of my spring, O Thou,
Sun reflected by millions of hearts.*

Pravda, August 28, 1936

Vladimir Ilyich [Lenin, in his Testament, suppressed by Stalin] said: ". . . I propose that the comrades consider the method by which Stalin would be removed from [his] position and by which another man would be selected for it; a man who, above all, would differ from Stalin in only one quality, namely, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude toward the comrades, a less capricious temper, etc."

TO THE LIGHT OF THE WORLD

*You have preserved 'gainst wiles of knave
The testament that Lenin gave.
The people from black woes you save;
You are the world's great light, O Stalin.*

SULEIMAN STALASKY

The Peoples' Poet of Soviet Daghestan

Stalin was a very distrustful man; sickly suspicious. We know this from our work with him . . . Everywhere and in everything he saw "enemies," "two facers" and "spies." Stalin sanctioned . . . torture and oppression.

Our Own Dear Comrade Stalin:

To you, our native father and teacher, to you, our great leader of Communism, of Bolsheviks and toilers, we, the toilers of Gruzinia, turn our fiery love, our faithfulness and our readiness to sacrifice ourselves in our struggle. Drop by drop of our blood, we are willing to give up our whole lives for new victories in the socialistic proletarian revolution. To you who raised us and looked after us in the heavy and gloomy past, to you who give us happiness and joy, we bring a Stalin's oath to be alert, to be wide awake, on the lookout for the enemy, regardless of how he masquerades, and to be merciless in destroying him . . . Long live our powerful, undefeated party of Lenin and Stalin! Long live our leader, our teacher,

our father, our friend, our dear, our own, the great Stalin!

Izvestia, August 27, 1936

The only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent probing proved, "confession" was acquired through physical pressures against the accused. . .

THE MAN I SING

The sorrow and the pain which falls on human hearts,

The sorrow and the pain which, binding hearts together,

Draw men in one great unity

To him who simple is and great,

To him whom men call Stalin.

D. HOFSTEIN, Soviet Poet

After the war . . . Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew. His persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions.

Our Stalin:

As if it were possible in a song by a singer to tell how dear, thou beloved, our father, art! Thou, like flint wert tempered in the front line of the crusaders! We hold thee in the cradle of our arms! In the cold of the winter thou art a shelter for us; in the heat of the summer thou art a cooling garden; thou art the wings that raise us to the skies; for the one who goes down under the ground thou art the air. Over our enemies thou art a stormy cloud; over the toilers' people thou art the sun; thou art the guardian who watches over ships and storms; to all born with an honest heart thou art their glory! How is it possible in a song for a singer to tell how dear to us thou art, Our great father, the sun of his country (Rodina), we bow to thee! As we hold our honor, we swear to thee to safeguard thy life; thy vision is our vision; thy thoughts our thoughts to the last one; thou art the flame of our thoughts and our blood. Thou art the high symbol of our strength.

Translated from Kumic by ESSENDI KAPILEF
Pravda, August 25, 1936

Neither

The "last and greatest" of the Presidential preference primaries, California's, is over and done with, and all who cared now know for a fact that Californians want Stevenson, not Kefauver (as Minnesotans want Kefauver, not Stevenson) to have the honor of getting trounced by Eisenhower in November. NATIONAL REVIEW, out of a long-standing fondness for Mr. Stevenson's speech-writers, did care—a little.

Stevenson now goes into the convention with a long

lead over Kefauver in pledged delegates. There, however, the criteria of judgment will be oceans apart from those that govern a preference primary contest. The big question will be, Who can come nearest to unifying the now woefully disunited Democratic Party behind the usual Democratic program of sober-sided softness toward Communism at home and abroad, and expanding government paternalism at home?

We do not venture to predict the convention's answer to that question. But we'd not be surprised if it were neither Stevenson nor Kefauver, since neither has shown any talent for dealing with the problems that today divide their Party.

The Quiet American

Mr. Michael Chinigo of INS cabled in on May 29 that in the opinion of "officials" of the Christian Democratic Party, Harry Truman contributed substantially to the success of the moderates in the municipal elections last week in Italy. The story is credible in one sense, for it attributed Truman's contribution to his having done and said nothing of a political character while in Italy. That being what Mr. Truman is most useful at doing, the story rang true.

In another sense, the dispatch seemed phoney, smelling of a house-organ puff for the benefit of a staff writer. (Mr. Truman is engaged, while abroad, in writing features for the Hearst press.) Mr. Chinigo's documentation is of epic vagueness. The front page story read "Italy Victors Hail Truman Visit as Help." That assertion is documented as follows: "Officials of the Segni Government said Truman's 'presence by itself was an important factor in the Christian Democratic victory.' They added: 'His careful avoidance of any contacts with candidates prevented the Communists and their allies from attacking him and arousing resentment from charges of interference. He was a big help.'"

No news, as they say, is good news—for the Republic of Italy, and for hard-pressed correspondents.

Just as NATIONAL REVIEW would believe Savonarola, not the cop, if the cop said he had caught Savonarola robbing a merchant's till, we choose to believe Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, not the Treasury Department, when the Treasury Department says, in effect, that he is doing business with the Chinese Reds. And we wish Mr. Kohlberg well in his suit to force the Treasury Department, which would not necessarily be above victimizing him a little, to issue him that import permit. (Mr. Kohlberg states that the six-hundred-odd thousand handkerchiefs the permit would cover originated in Hong Kong, and not, as the Treasury Department contends, in Communist China.)

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

The Symington Hearings on Airpower: A Report

President Eisenhower's "war is unthinkable" thesis has been successfully rebutted. Either that, or General Curtis LeMay and his Strategic Air Command lieutenants are incompetents and/or willful liars.

The closed-session testimony of SAC commander LeMay before the Symington Subcommittee on the Air Force has established, as conclusively as such things can be established, two main points: a) that the decision between the Free World and Communism—irrespective of how the propaganda and economic-aid battles, on which the U.S. is now concentrating, are going—may well be a military one; and b) that the winner in a military contest—assuming the U.S. sticks to its current military expansion plans, and, perhaps, no matter what the U.S. does in the way of future expansion—will be the Soviet Union.

The Problem

LeMay began by repeating what his political superiors have said a hundred times before him: that U.S. policy is to keep the peace by maintaining a deterrent military force capable of discouraging the enemy from making war. LeMay proceeded to define his terms: "A deterrent force is an effective nuclear offensive force which . . . regardless of what offensive action [the enemy] takes against it . . . can still inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy."

Moreover, LeMay went on, U.S. hopes for victory rest, in a showdown, on the offensive air power the U.S. has on hand at the time hostilities commence.

[Our joint Army-Air war games prove that] airpower is decisive . . . [This] does not mean necessarily that the war is over the minute the airpower battle has been won. It does mean that when the airpower battle has been won and you are free to roam the skies of the enemy, the decisive phase has been concluded . . . The second conclusion [of the war

games is that] it was not the defense which determined who won the battle. It was the offense which determined it.

Then, on the point whether the U.S. can, as it did in World War Two, count on catching up in the production race after the attack:

We are firmly convinced that with the capability the Russians have today, they can destroy our aircraft industry and we will have to fight with the aircraft [we have on hand] the day the war starts.

The Danger

The U.S. layman could accept this definition of the problem and remain, on the basis of what he has always thought to be axiomatic about SAC's ability to deliver, unconcerned. After all, the U.S. has hundreds of hydrogen and atom bombs, and lots of planes to carry them to enemy targets; therefore, what could Curtis LeMay be worried about?

The danger, as LeMay sees it, is that his air force *will never get off the ground*. Or, more concisely: that the planes that will get off the ground will not—assuming a sudden, surprise attack by the Communists—be in such numbers and of such quality as to be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union.

The military situation LeMay wanted to tell the Symington Committee about is that which will predictably confront the U.S. by 1959. By that time, the Soviets will have "twice as many long-range bombers" (Bisons and Bears) as the U.S. will have. Judging from estimates of future U.S. B-52 production, this means approximately fourteen hundred. (The Soviet Bison is a jet-bomber, comparable to our B-52, which can carry a 10,000-pound bomb load anywhere, from northern U.S. to Cuba, and return—its range depending upon the take-off point in the Soviet Union, and the number of air refuelings en route. The Bear is a turbo-prop aircraft, some-

what slower than the Bison and the B-52, but possessing a greater range that would make possible a hydrogen-bombing mission, as far south as Panama.)

LeMay assumes that from 70 to 75 per cent of the Bisons and Bears will be able to penetrate U.S. defenses and drop their bomb loads on strategic targets. An even greater percentage of Soviet bombers would probably get through if long-range Bears outflanked our northern radar detection system and swung in at the "soft southern underbelly" of the U.S. from the Gulf of Mexico. (A majority of SAC's bases are in the South, and our Gulf Coast radar system will be inferior to that now under construction in central Canada and along our East and West coastlines.)

Such a bomber force will be able to blanket SAC's 31 bases in the continental U.S., hundreds of other military and communications installations, all of our aircraft factories and several score cities to boot. Soviet middle-range bombers will be able to achieve similar coverage of SAC overseas bases in Europe, Iceland, North Africa and the Near East.

U.S. planners assume, LeMay added, that the Communist striking force may by that time be augmented by 1,500-mile guided missiles launched from the Red Fleet's 400 submarines operating in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. Presumably, such missiles could also be launched from the Soviet Union itself against our bases in the Near East.

Whether SAC, as the principal target of such an assault, will be able to perform its mission, depends on a number of factors. For one, the efficiency of SAC's alert system. (LeMay hopes that by 1960 his entire force will be able to take off within fifteen minutes of the first alert.) For another, the quantity and quality of SAC's bombers. (The principal U.S. striking force, as of now, consists of middle-range B-47s which are stationed overseas. The long-range bomber that the U.S. now has in quantity, the old B-36, is obsolete. General LeMay observed: "If I had my desires now, they would all be in junkpiles.")

The B-36 is to be replaced by the B-52 jet of which SAC had only 41 in acceptable condition as of May 1. Moreover, B-52s are being produced

at the rate of four or five a month, and the projected goal for the future is 17, perhaps 20 a month. And this despite the fact, the Symington Committee learned, that a single Boeing plant in Seattle is capable of turning out 45 per month!

A further factor in the computation is the progress of U.S. guided missile development—which, according to all educated guesses, is months, possibly years behind that of the Soviet Union. The most important factor of all, and one about which the transcript of the Symington hearings left not a single clue, is the U.S. estimate of what is “unacceptable damage” to the Soviet Union—i.e., of what amount of damage the Soviets would, at the margin, be willing to absorb as the price of knocking out the U.S.

General LeMay and his staff periodically put these and other factors together in hypothetical “war games” which permit SAC to estimate U.S. chances of successfully retaliating after a Soviet attack. Two such war games—one incorporating factors applicable today, the other, those expected to be applicable in 1960—were described in detail to the Symington Committee. So sensitive was the information included in these briefings that the committee stenographer was forbidden to record them. At the end, however, SAC’s general conclusions were made public. And they provided a terrifying picture of the U.S.’s slumping military posture.

The Prognosis

As of today, General LeMay summed up, “under any reasonable set of assumptions we believe we now have the capability of winning any war the Soviets might start. We are not [however] capable of winning it without this country receiving very serious damage.” Then the General added this footnote, which is illustrative of the trend: “Five years ago we could have won the war without the country receiving comparatively serious damage.”

Later on in the hearings, LeMay expanded his summary to include what *might* happen, even today, under the worst possible conditions:

If everything went in his [the enemy’s] favor, and we made all the mistakes possible to make, and we were caught completely by surprise

on the ground—I might add, I don’t think this is possible to happen—but if it did happen, we only have thirty-some bases, and I think that they could all be hit; and in that case, we would have practically nothing left to do any retaliating with.

As regards the predictable future, the following colloquy speaks for itself:

Senator Symington. Now, as I understood it, you felt by the middle of 1958 that they might destroy the United States, if they handled an attack wisely against us?

General LeMay. No: I think I pointed out that in 1958 they were going to be stronger, and from then on getting stronger. . . . And that the deterrent force would then transfer to Russia from the United States.

Senator Symington. Let me ask my question again. In what year . . . if the present programs go along [i.e., if present U.S. and Soviet military expansion plans are implemented] in what year do you think they will be in a position, if they hit us, to destroy us? . . .

General LeMay. . . . You noticed on the war-gaming, the staff exercise we gave you, what happened in 1960 with a surprise attack; we lost definitely with that number. So that is definite; 1960, he can do it with a complete surprise attack. Now the problem is to back off to where you think that same thing will happen. I pointed out that in 1958 we would probably be equal. So somewhere between those two, possibly, is the answer, say 1959.

Finally, General LeMay submitted this judgment:

Now, whether the Russians would attack then [1958-60], or not, depends upon his military estimate of the situation, and his war-gaming as to what would happen . . . I don’t know what the outcome of that would be. However, the only thing I can say is that from 1958 on, he is stronger in long-range airpower than we are, and it naturally follows that if he is stronger, he may feel that he should attack.

Between the lines, General LeMay’s real fears could be read somewhat as follows:

For a probably limited period after 1959 (say, for two or three years) the U.S. will not possess a “deterrent force”—i.e., a force capable, by definition, of discouraging the Soviets from launching a successful military attack against the U.S. But thereafter, the U.S. may, in any one of several ways, regain the power to deter a nuclear attack.

Thus Soviet strategists will, perforce, be thinking along these lines:

“During this interim period, we can pursue our goal of world domination either a) by launching a necessarily risky, though predictably successful military attack against the U.S., or b) by continuing to press a policy (also necessarily risky) of more or less peaceful acquisition of the territories outstanding against us. But at the end of this period we will have only alternative b; alternative a, moreover, may never again be available to us.”

The Soviet leaders, in other words, may feel they have “a now or never” opportunity in the years immediately following 1958, of the sort the U.S. had after World War Two and, very probably, still has today. Curtis LeMay evidently fears that the Communists may possess the nerve to exploit their opportunity.

But the threat of a Soviet nuclear attack is only one aspect of the peril. Perhaps the most significant revelation of LeMay’s testimony was that, after 1958, Soviet Russia will possess a “deterrent force.” This means that, whether or not the U.S. has a deterrent force of its own, the Soviets will be capable, from 1958 on, of preventing the U.S. from making foreign policy from a position of strength.

And this means that Mr. Dulles’ policy of “massive retaliation,” *vis-à-vis* local wars, will no longer be available to the U.S. The Communists, with overt Russian participation, will, that is to say, be able to wage conventional warfare against the Free World without fear of nuclear reprisals. No responsible military leader expects the U.S., with its hopeless inferiority in manpower, to be able to win such local conventional wars.

The Cure

General LeMay says he needs more trained men, more planes, more bases than the Eisenhower Administration wants to give him. There is increasing congressional sentiment in favor of his having them. The haunting impression left by LeMay’s description of SAC’s problems, nevertheless, is that those things in themselves are not enough—that nothing will turn the trick except giving a man like Curtis LeMay the authority to take the initiative.

Letter from London

F. A. VOIGT

Eden's Gift to the Soviets: the Middle East

We have made our greatest mistake vis-à-vis Soviet Russia since the cold war began—and I date the cold war from November 1941, when Tito first attacked Mihailovich.

Why have we made that mistake? What necessity was there to give way to Soviet Russia in the Middle East? Perhaps the loss of Central and Eastern Europe could not have been prevented altogether. After all, the Russians were *there*, and it would have been no easy matter to get them out. But the Russians were not in the Middle East. Why, then, did we invite them in?

If Soviet Russia were ever to become ruler of the Middle East, she would acquire the richest oil reserves in the Old World. She would have become a Mediterranean power. She would be able to intervene decisively in the affairs of Northern and equatorial Africa, eliminate the last vestiges of British, French and American influence and, in course of time, extend her power to the shores of the middle Atlantic. She would, with China, be able to undertake the conquest of all Southern and Southeastern Asia.

The task of the Atlantic Allies in the Middle East was plain. It was, evidently, to keep Soviet Russia out.

But the Western allies have already begun to let Russia in. They are interpreting the term "peaceful coexistence" in the way Communism wants to have it interpreted. It no longer means "coexistence" between Middle Eastern powers and Soviet Russia as a *non-Middle-Eastern* power. She is now *de facto* recognized as a Middle Eastern power.

Whenever Soviet Russia says "coexistence," she means "coexistence" on *our* side of the Iron Curtain, never on *her* side. There is no question of "coexistence" between her and the Atlantic Allies in Eastern Europe. But "coexistence" in the Middle East has been explicitly conceded by the British Government. And it is this that gives the recent conversations

between Sir Anthony Eden and Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev in London their real significance.

Russia brought Egypt to the brink of war with Israel. But she stopped her at the brink for certain reasons:

It is her interest to reduce Egypt and the other Arab states to ever greater dependence on Russian aid. It is also her interest to sustain and, from time to time, increase the tension in the Middle East so as to make the Western allies the more inclined to allow her an ever greater share in Middle Eastern affairs. This latter calculation has been strikingly justified by events: By making Egypt knock peremptorily at Israel's door (the back door to the Middle East), Russia has induced Great Britain to invite her in by the front door.

This capitulation is supported by the full weight of British public opinion (the *Conservative Daily Telegraph* seems to be alone in its misgivings). And, as far as we can judge from this side of the Atlantic, both the American Administration and the greater part of American public opinion endorse Great Britain's Middle Eastern policy.

The *Liberal Manchester Guardian*, which many regard as England's best newspaper, shares the serial rights to Mr. Walter Lippmann's articles with the *New York Herald Tribune*. Mr. Lippmann, who was introduced to the readers of the *Manchester Guardian* with a fanfare by Mr. Alistair Cooke, is now for England, more than ever, the most influential American writer on international affairs.

His policy exercises a special attraction because it conforms with the conciliatory spirit of the time. While serving the supposed interests of the Atlantic powers, it serves the real interests of Soviet Russia. It imparts to the term "peaceful coexistence" its real, that is, its Soviet meaning.

The effect of Mr. Lippmann's policy, were it to be adopted by the Atlantic allies—and in principle they

have adopted it already—would be the progressive transfer of vital Anglo-American positions to Soviet Russia through the medium of the United Nations. There would, in other words, be a twofold surrender by the British and American governments—a surrender to a foreign power, and a surrender to a cosmopolitan super-government.

Mr. Lippmann tells us frankly that the "rulers of Russia" have

in the United Nations policy . . . won recognition by Britain and America that the Soviet Union is a Great Power in the Middle East, that the Middle East is not a British-American sphere of influence from which they are excluded.

The White Paper issued by the Foreign Office on the conversations in London is not directly concerned with the United States, but it proposes a policy which is entirely consistent with Mr. Lippmann's. According to the White Paper, the British and Russian governments

will give the necessary support to the United Nations in its endeavor to strengthen peace in the region of Palestine and to carry out the appropriate decisions of the Security Council.

The British and the Soviet governments have agreed to make common cause within the United Nations with regard to Israel and Egypt. Soviet Russia is thereby enabled to circumvent the Bagdad Pact. The concurrence of the United States is, apparently, assumed.

We must, therefore, expect the emergence of a consortium of the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia to make joint decisions affecting the future of the Middle East. And, as we shall no doubt discover (probably too late), of much more than the Middle East.

A capitulation so inimical to their vital interests and, at the same time, so unnecessary, can have few if any precedents in the history either of Great Britain or of the United States.

Referring back to the discussions in London, Mr. Lippmann tells us:

The recognition in London that Russia shares the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the Middle East is, in the perspective of history, a big event. We may be living in its many consequences from this time forwards.

We may. Indeed, we shall.

Is the Air Still Ours?

The U.S., says a famous authority, is falling behind the USSR in aeronautics. To survive, it must change its whole military strategy

ALEXANDER P. DE SEVERSKY

In the face of the fantastic technological progress made by both the West and Russia, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, has publicly asserted that he is against fundamental changes in our military strategy, and that if such changes are to be made they should come gradually, "as a process of evolution." The danger in this philosophy is that while we evolve at leisure, the energetic enemy is overtaking us technologically.

Soviet overflights in Moscow last year dramatically demonstrated to the Free World that Russia has in service a long-range, intercontinental bomber: the new T-37, known as the "Bison." From data available there is no doubt in my mind that this bomber, already operational with the Red Air Force, is superior to anything we have in production, including the great hope of our Strategic Air Command, the B-52, only now beginning to be delivered to the Air Force.

Because of powerful by-pass jet engines of revolutionary design, which we failed to produce in America, and because of lavish use of titanium, which is still scarce here, the Soviet Bisons are true intercontinental bombers, which could attack our entire northern belt of states directly from Siberian bases, and return without refueling. We have no such plane. Our current operational models of both the medium-range B-47 and the somewhat longer-range B-52 are dependent on either intermediary bases or cumbersome in-flight refueling to reach enemy targets. Only when engines comparable in performance to Russia's by-pass engine are produced in this country will the B-52 acquire truly intercontinental range.

Russia's air force, free from dependence on stepping-stone bases, can strike at us with "frightful surprise" (to use President Eisenhower's phrase at Geneva), whereas our in-

tentions would be revealed to the enemy in advance as we poised our planes on overseas bases prior to attack.

Russia sprang another surprise at that Moscow air show by revealing a flock of supersonic fighter aircraft, which are bound to excel the performance of our present service models because they are also powered by the by-pass engine, which reportedly has twice the thrust of our existing models and a more economical specific fuel consumption than the current jet engines. These fighters can not only defend their home skies by shooting down our current poorly armed bombers but, striking with nuclear weapons, they can pick off our air bases on the Eurasian continent like so many sitting ducks.

Precious Time Lost

But that is not all. A third significant jump made by the Russian aviation industry was demonstrated by a mass flight of turbo-prop bombers. These new Soviet planes can reach even farther than the Bison, and could strike at the very heart of this country.

We have no comparable aircraft in service, because until recently we could not get delivery on such engines. We could have obtained proven foreign prototypes and put them into immediate production. Instead, because of false pride in our own technical superiority, we insisted on starting from scratch and developing American prototypes. So we lost precious time and money, and were forced after all, in some cases, to turn belatedly to Britain for help and licenses in a last-minute effort to keep abreast with aviation progress. To our added humiliation, some U.S. airlines are already flying British turbo-prop aircraft in order to meet competition.

What was the response to public consternation at the disclosure of foreign aeronautical leadership? Vigorous measures to correct the situation? The adoption of new policies to replace erroneous ones? Not at all. The response was a supercolossal, Hollywood-type public relations and advertising campaign to herald the appearance of "artist's conceptions" of the superb American commercial jet aircraft that will maintain fantastic flight schedules—four years from now.

This alluring dream of American jet transport supremacy was rudely shattered last March when General Ivan Serov was flown to London, not in an "artist's conception," but in a magnificent twin-engine jet transport, acclaimed by all experts as "more advanced than anything likely to be available in Britain or America for at least three years." Since then, several of these advanced Soviet planes have appeared in Europe, and negotiations are under way which will enable Russia this year to start regular jet airline service between Moscow and the principal cities of Europe.

On top of all this, the USSR has now extended an invitation to General Nathan F. Twining and to the air chiefs of other Allied nations to attend an air show in Moscow on June 24th. The purpose of this, I am convinced, is to scare the Free World out of its wits by presenting incontestable evidence of Soviet aeronautical superiority. Most likely, however, the accent will be ostensibly on commercial aviation, in line with Russia's "peaceful coexistence" propaganda. I expect them to unveil a new four-jet engine transport that in size and performance will match our own prematurely touted 1960 models.

The picture in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) is just as dismal. While our armed services engage in a jurisdictional dispute over control of this lethal

weapon, and confidently predict that, given the necessary wherewithal, they will be able in five years to hit a target 1,500 miles away, the inconsiderate enemy—according to latest reports—has already achieved the 1,500-mile range experimentally and is well on the way to developing an intercontinental missile of 5,000-mile range—the so-called “ultimate weapon.” In the meantime, we learn, they are in mass production of 800-mile range ballistic missiles, of which we have none.

With these missiles, together with its supersonic aircraft armed with nuclear warheads, Russia could easily destroy all our overseas air bases simultaneously, thereby stripping our medium-range Strategic Air Command of its power to retaliate.

Thus we are near the point of total bankruptcy of the concept of “strategic-air-offensive-via-bases”—bases both fixed on land and floating. This means that our huge inventory of limited-range aircraft is useless, and that billions of dollars spent on those aircraft, overseas bases and super-aircraft-carriers will now have to be written off as a total loss.

The Soviets Are Ahead

From the foregoing facts it is clear that, notwithstanding all the propaganda to the contrary, we are falling dangerously behind in aeronautics, both commercially and militarily. I am not alone in this alarming conclusion. General Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, went as far as he could when he stated that “there is one way that the Soviets are ahead of us. They are ahead in rate of progress.” Similarly, Lt. General Thomas S. Power, Commander of the U.S. Air Force Air Research and Development Command, stated in a speech on January 19 before the National Security Industrial Association that the Soviets have “the largest fighter defense force in the world, completely jet-equipped.” And that

The Soviet jet bombers displayed in formation strength over Moscow last July included four-jet heavy bombers comparable to the eight-jet B-52, our most advanced heavy bomber, and medium twin-jet bombers comparable to our six-jet B-47. The smaller number of engines in the Soviet bombers permit the conclusion that they have developed unusually powerful engines.

Mr. Gill Robb Wilson, president of the Air Force Association, in an editorial in *Flying* magazine describing the superiority of Russia's newly revealed aircraft, concluded significantly: “Only two vital advantages remain to American air supremacy—a proven skill to wage strategic air war, and a superior supply of hydrogen warheads.” But hydrogen warheads are meaningless without superior means of delivery.

In the light of the fantastic progress being made by the Communists, I cannot agree with our government's official view that “Our security posture commands respect.”

From the end of World War Two until quite recently the United States had a complete monopoly of atomic weapons and the means with which to deliver them to enemy targets. The threat that we might unleash this power held the Communists in check and prevented another world war. Foreign policy is only as good as the military power by which it is buttressed. Consequently, in the face of the avowed Communist determination to dominate the world, Secretary Dulles' threat of massive retaliation as an instrument of our national policy was valid and morally right. Throughout history, the superior military force-in-being has been used as an instrument of national policy. And once we in America had acquired the ability to destroy our enemies through a powerful Air Force-in-being, it was possible and proper to use the fact of this new military strength as a deterrent to Communist aggression.

Mr. Dulles could well afford so to use it as long as General LeMay was standing behind him ready to deliver his atomic punch, and as long as the Communists were not ready to challenge our strength. He could have used it in Korea, China, Indochina, with powerful deterrent effect. But when the Communists are ready they will not wait for provocation; they will attack us at a time of their own choosing.

And that time may not be far away. Unless we make a superhuman effort to regain our military leadership, it is Russia that will have the deterrent force. It is the Communists who will acquire the power of persuasion over the Free World through the threat of massive retaliation.

The threatening readjustment of international power relations, to the advantage of Communism and the detriment of the Free World, does not appear to worry our Secretary of Defense. “Nothing,” said Mr. Wilson, in commenting on the 1957 budget, “has occurred in the international situation during the past year which would indicate the necessity for any major change in [military] policies and concepts.” Later, in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, he showed even less awareness of our critical military position:

We have today, and we will have for the foreseeable future, the capability of inflicting vast destruction upon any aggressor anywhere in the world. This capability cannot be thwarted. Retaliatory force of vast proportions can be applied regardless of a massive surprise attack on our country and regardless of defensive maneuvers of the aggressor. This fact is the key deterrent to war. It is obvious to anyone that war doesn't pay. No recent development and no foreseeable development will basically change this situation.

All this in the face of the imminent total collapse of our retaliatory power via air bases and aircraft-carriers!

Secretary Wilson also said that “since our problems are quite different, our own defense needs must be governed by more than Soviet statistics.” With this I differ. The level of the military forces we are forging for our national defense must be governed primarily by the capability of the enemy they will have to overcome. It will be unfortunate if our military strength is to be governed primarily by other factors, such as fiscal considerations or political expediencies in an election year.

There is no time left for the gradual evolution Admiral Radford envisages. If we are to survive, there must be fundamental and immediate changes in our military strategy. We must keep in mind that the Soviet regime did not hesitate to liquidate twenty million of its own people to perpetuate itself in power. It will not hesitate to kill off twice or thrice that number of both Russians and Americans to achieve by force its goal of world domination, should its present methods of infiltration and subversion fail. Therefore, those who state that full-scale nuclear warfare is impossible are simply indulging in wishful think-

ing. On the contrary, since the passive acquiescence of the Free World in Communist domination is unthinkable, only the miracle of the spontaneous internal collapse of the Soviet system can prevent such a war.

More money for national defense will not alone solve the problem. Unless our whole military philosophy is changed we shall forever trail the rest of the world, not only in conventional aircraft, but in intercontinental ballistic missiles and even in man-made earth-satellite development.

Unification Act an Obstacle


Although I have been critical of Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford, I must say in fairness to them that their attitude and actions are not so much the product of their own military astigmatism as of the fallacious framework within which they are condemned to work. We shall never get anywhere until Congress repeals the Unification Act of 1947 and provides for a military establishment attuned to the technology of our times. The unification law is the basic obstacle to the development of sound and realistic strategy; it has fastened upon us the curse of the outmoded strategy of balanced forces.

I, consequently, fought the provisions of the Unification Bill with every means at my command. I feared that it would condemn us to three separate, competing and incompatible strategies. I also warned the American people and Congress that it would lead to the regimentation of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to a virtual dictatorship by a single powerful Secretary over every aspect of defense. Under the Act, we do not have civilian control over the military—which was its original purpose—because a dictator in mufti is no less a dictator than one in uniform. The Secretary of Defense (who most likely has only a vague knowledge of strategic matters) can demand absolute conformity by our top military experts to his personal views.

The essence of civilian control over the military lies in wide popular participation in primary strategic decisions, and in direct accountability and access to Congress by the heads of our military services, who should be able to defend their policies and convictions without fear of adminis-

trative reprisals. Today no expert with military or industrial connections dares to challenge the infallibility of the Secretary of Defense for fear of losing rank, contracts, or his job, particularly after Secretary Wilson's recent warning, "We'll see who sticks their head up next. I think it might be a little dangerous."

As a consequence of unification, we already have five different air forces: The U.S. Air Force proper, the Naval Air Force, the Army Air Force, the Marine Air Force, and the Coast Guard Air Force. Moreover, we have reached the stage of absurdity where the Navy is a self-contained Defense Department. It has its ships, its army in the form of a Marine Corps, and its own air force. The Army, on the other hand, has its navy in the form of a harbor and river flotilla, and now clamors for its own complete air



component. Under the circumstances, it would be scarcely less logical for the Air Force to demand its own navy and its own army to supply and protect its far-flung air bases and see to it that it has its own radar picket ships to insure timely air-raid warning. Sounds absurd? It is absurd.

In this limited space I cannot give a detailed plan of a military establishment that would answer our defense needs. I can only repeat what I recommended in 1950, that we must integrate our three services into a single military service, with one uniform, one promotion list, and a single general staff; a department in which we have bureaus of ships, of the ground forces, and of other auxiliaries.

Such changes cannot be expected to come from the Pentagon. Even though some of the Chiefs of Staff individually see their wisdom and timeliness, as a group they are entirely too regimented under the present setup to make such recommendations with impunity.

There is only one source from which

the necessary changes can come, and that is the American people, bringing pressure on their representatives in Congress. But they cannot act unless they are brought to realize the dangers inherent in our present military system. A thoroughgoing public debate on the subject of our national defense and foreign policy is a vital necessity. The recent wide-open controversy among the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an indication that something is alarmingly wrong with our military setup. To label these differences of opinion a squabble or bickering is unfair, since they go to the very root of our national defense and our country's survival. The present attempt to iron out such differences, behind closed doors, by disciplinary action or Executive order may temporarily silence but cannot resolve them. The issues must be brought out into the open, for only the American people have the power to settle them.

Those who feel that military matters are not the concern of the people are mistaken. Tactics and weapons are admittedly the province of the military expert, but over-all national military strategy, like any other policy that affects our national welfare, is the province of the people. Moreover, in a democracy such as ours, enemy agents can move with comparative freedom. As a consequence, the enemy is even better informed than some of our top officials, who often get facts colored by political expediency. Therefore, our strength must be inherent and obvious to all. A free society cannot win a war by deception or surprise. Once our people are brought to understand the meaning and importance of global command of the air, they will call to leadership men who have the kind of knowledge, experience and philosophy that is adapted to this era of devastating nuclear weapons and global ranges at supersonic speeds.

Today, no other course is open to us than to see to it that America is strong in its own right. If we are to survive, our Air Force must be able to achieve global command of the air directly from this continent—from home bases, the *only* bases that can be defended adequately—so that our country's strength cannot be impaired, no matter what happens anywhere on the face of the earth.

THE LAW OF THE LAND

C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS

The Supreme Court: October Term, 1955

It has been persuasively asserted by such diverse authorities as Chief Justice Hughes, Chief Justice Stone, Thomas Jefferson, Louis B. Boudin, Prof. Fred Rodell and Sen. James O. Eastland, among many others, that the policy concepts, or "personal predilections," of Supreme Court justices influence their decisions. Such assertions are made with special vigor when it is apparent that the Court has determined an issue not in accordance with any very clear and definite constitutional or statutory provisions, or judicial precedent, that the arguments on one side are pretty much as good as those on the other, and that a large measure of discretion resting on policy as distinct from strictly legal considerations has been or may have been involved. If the Court divides in a series of cases of public interest and importance in which these factors are present, with one set of justices continually on one side and another set in dissent, historically a public agitation has developed.

There was such a series at October Term, 1955, the session about to adjourn. In these cases a majority reached results tending to protect Communists. They were:

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, holding that in a denaturalization proceeding the government must preliminarily file an affidavit by a witness to the facts upon which it relies. Justices Reed, Minton and Clark dissented, arguing that the decision overruled a long line of lower court cases and thirty years administrative practice.

Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, holding that the Board must reconsider its decision that the Communist Party was under Soviet Union control in the light of attacks on the credibility of three witnesses. Justices Reed, Minton and Clark dissented, holding the testimony of these witnesses negligible considering the entire record.

Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, holding unconstitutional

Section 903 of the New York City Charter, under which a city employee is automatically dismissed upon invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, when applied to an employee who invoked the privilege before a committee of the U.S. Senate. Justices Burton, Reed, Minton and Harlan dissented primarily on the ground that the city should be permitted to require its employees to cooperate with public authorities.

It deserves note that none of the four decisions is of necessarily major consequence. Thus, Congress can amend both the Smith Act so as to permit state court prosecutions and the denaturalization statute so as to remove the affidavit impediment; the Subversive Activities Control Board will undoubtedly reaffirm its earlier decision; the Board of Higher Education can, the Slochower opinion seems to say, dismiss a professor who pleads the Fifth Amendment to a congressional committee if the Board asks the same question and receives the same answer. The decisions do, however, constitute a setback to law enforcement in this important field, in which many think it has already been unduly delayed.

To say that a decision tends to protect Communists is, of course, not to say that it is wrong. No one would suggest that a Communist, or one accused of a crime involving Communism, should be deprived of the protections of the Bill of Rights construed in accordance with settled principles. The agitation comes about because the decisions fall within the pattern which I have already defined, that is, appear to rest on policy concepts. And anti-Communists, at least those of the "hard" variety, do not agree with the policy of adding, at this time, to the ample protections the Communists already have.

To comment upon these decisions is peculiarly difficult. Professor Robert A. Dahl has referred to the attempts of legal scholars "to reconcile

the patent fact that the Supreme Court is a legislative body with the theory that it is not." And analysis of what is essentially a legislative decision is impeded when the reasons given for it are expressed in judicial terms. Moreover, differing in this respect from comparable situations in the previous history of the Court, the policy views of many of the justices on the points at issue are unknown. Prior to his appointment, Chief Justice Marshall had been an active Federalist who had gone on record as an advocate of a strong central government. Chief Justice Taney was long a champion of states' rights and slavery. The justices who so frequently held social welfare legislation unconstitutional between the late 1870's and the late 1930's were for the most part individualists who believed in a minimum of state interference. Such decisions as *McCulloch v. Maryland*, *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, *Lochner v. New York*, *Adair v. United States* thus followed logically from their authors' known convictions.

It is not so easy to explain these last decisions.

The Court consists of nine men. The majority always included Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas. The minority always included Justices Reed and Minton. Justices Burton and Harlan each joined the minority once, and Justice Clark twice. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas were, prior to their appointment, identified with those elements of public opinion which today have notably seen more risk to a free society in possible injustices in the exposure and prosecution of Communists than in possible espionage and treason by them. Justices Reed and Minton were, prior to their appointment, regarded as advocates of greater state control of corporations. Perhaps they tend to see things from the point of view of the state, whoever the defendant may be.

There is little in the background of the other justices that throws light on their decisions in these cases — too little, really, to serve as a basis even for speculation. Not until the Warren Court is a number of years older will students have sufficient perspective to analyze its philosophy with confidence.

What Individualism Is Not

With characteristic verve, the author of "One Is A Crowd" disputes the charge of selfish materialism and stresses the spiritual basis of individualism

FRANK CHODOROV

The bottle is now labelled libertarianism. But its content is nothing new; it is what in the nineteenth century, and up to the time of Franklin Roosevelt, was called liberalism—the advocacy of limited government and a free economy. (If you think of it, you will see that there is a redundancy in this formula, for a government of limited powers would have little chance of interfering with the economy.) The liberals were robbed of their time-honored name by the unprincipled socialists and near-socialists, whose avidity for prestige words knows no bounds. So, forced to look for another and distinctive label for their philosophy they came up with libertarianism—good enough but somewhat difficult for the tongue.

They might have done better by adopting the older and more meaningful name of individualism, but they bypassed it because it, too, had been more than sullied by its opponents. The smear technique of winning an argument is as old as argument. The mud with which individualism has been bespattered still hides its true character, and every so often new gobs are thrown at it by "scholars" who simply don't like it. Some of the modern traducers even affect the conservative title.

The mud-slinging started long ago, but the more recent and best-known orgy occurred in the early part of the century when the heaven-by-way-of-government muckrakers attached to individualism a value-impregnated adjective—"rugged." The word itself has no moral content; when applied to a mountain it is purely descriptive, when applied to an athlete it carries a favorable connotation. But, in the literary usage of the muckrakers, it designated what in plain language would be called skulduggery. It has no more to do with a philosophy than has any form of indecent behavior. Thus, the "rugged individualist" was

the fellow who threatened to foreclose the mortgage on the old homestead if the fair damsel refused his hand in marriage; or he was the speculator who made use of the stock market to rob "widows and orphans"; or he was the fat and florid buccaneer who lavished diamonds on his lady love. He was, in short, a fellow whose conscience presented no obstacle to his inclination to grab a dollar, and who recognized no code of ethics that might curb his appetites. If there is any difference between an ordinary thief and a "rugged individualist," it is in the fact that the latter almost always keeps within the letter of the law, even if he has to rewrite the law to do so.

To the socialist, of course, intellectual integrity is excess baggage, even as morality is excess baggage to the "rugged individualist." If the word "rugged" could confound the opposition, why not use it to the full? The fact that individualism, as a philosophy, looks upon the state with a jaundiced eye would hardly deter the socialist (to whom the state is the all-in-all) from equating individualism with the manipulation of the state in the interest of the rich. "Rugged individualism" was a propaganda phrase of the first order. It was most useful in bringing the "soak the rich" urgency to a boiling point.

The phrase gained currency at the time when the levelling mania was fighting its way into the American tradition, before the government, making full use of the new power it had acquired under the income-tax law, took hold of the individual by the scruff of the neck and made a mass-man out of him. It is an odd fact that the socialist is quite in agreement with the "rugged individualist" in advocating the use of political force to achieve one's "good"; the difference between them is only in determining the incidence, or the recipient, of

government-given "good." It is doubtful whether the "robber barons" (a synonym for "rugged individualists") ever used the government, before the income tax, with anything like the vigor and success of the socialists. At any rate, the stigma of "ruggedness" has stuck, so that the collectivist "intellectuals," who ought to know better, are unaware of the difference between thievery and individualism.

Original Smear Words

The besmirching of individualism, however, had a good start before the modern era. The original defamers were not socialists but solid proponents of status, the upholders of special privilege, the mercantilists of the nineteenth century. Their opposition stemmed in part from the fact that individualism leaned heavily on the burgeoning doctrine of the free market, of laissez-faire economics, and as such presented a challenge to their preferred position. So they dug into the age-old bag of semantics and came up with two smear words: "selfish" and "materialistic." Just like the later socialists, they had no compunction about twisting the truth to suit their argument.

Laissez-faire—that is to say an economy free of political interventions and subventions—holds that the instinct of self-interest is the motive power of productive effort. Nothing is produced except by human labor, and labor is something the human being is most parsimonious about; if he could satisfy his desires without effort, he would gladly dispense with it. That is why he invents labor-saving devices. But he is so constituted that every gratification gives rise to new desire, which he proceeds to satisfy by investing the labor he saved. He is insatiable. The log cabin that was palace enough in the wilderness seems quite inadequate as soon as the

pioneer accumulates a surplus of necessities, and then he begins to dream of curtains and pictures, inside plumbing, a school or a church, to say nothing of baseball or Beethoven. Self-interest overcomes his aversion to labor in his constant drive to improve his circumstances and widen his horizon. If the individual is not interfered with in the enjoyment of the products of his labor, his property, he will multiply his productive efforts and there will be a general abundance for the benefit of society as a whole.

It is in the free market that self-interest finds its finest expression; that is a cardinal point in individualism. If the market is regularly raided, by robbers or the government, and the safety of property is impaired, the individual loses interest in production, and the abundance of things men live by shrinks. Hence, it is for the good of society that self-interest in the economic sphere be allowed to operate without hindrance.

But self-interest is not selfishness. Self-interest will impel the manufacturer to improve upon his output so as to attract trade, while selfishness will prompt him to seek the special privileges and state favor that in the end destroy the very system of economic freedom on which he depends. The worker who tries to improve his lot by rendering better service could hardly be called selfish; the description rather fits the worker who demands that he be paid for not working. The subsidy-seeker is selfish, and so is every citizen who uses the law to enrich himself at the expense of other citizens.

The Free Market

Then there is the charge of "materialism." Laissez-faire, of course, rests its case on abundance; if people want lots of things, the way to get them is through freedom of production and exchange. In that respect, it could be called "materialistic." But, the laissez-faire economist as economist does not question or evaluate men's desires; he has no opinion on the "ought" or "should" of their aspirations. Whether they prefer culture to gadgets, or put a higher value on ostentation than on spiritual matters, is not his concern; the free market, he insists, is mechanistic and

amoral. If one's preference is for leisure, for instance, it is through abundance that his desire can be best satisfied; for an abundance of things makes them cheaper, easier to get, and thus one is enabled to indulge a liking for vacations. And a concert is probably better enjoyed by a well-fed esthete than by a hungry one. At any rate, the economist refuses to pass judgment on men's preferences; whatever they want, they will get more of it out of a free market than one commandeered by policemen.

But the critics of the nineteenth century blithely passed over this point, even as modern socialists ignore it. They insisted on attaching moral content to the free economy; it is a philosophy, they asserted, that puts a premium on things, rather than on cultural and spiritual values. Its emphasis on abundance is "materialistic" and the ultimate outcome of a free economy is a society devoid of appreciation for the finer things in life.

In point of fact—while the free market is itself a mechanism neutral to values expressing men's desires, whatever they may be—the free-market theory rests on the tacit acceptance of a purely spiritual concept, namely: that man is endowed with the capacity of making choices, with free will. If it were not for this purely human trait, there would be no market place, and human life would be akin to that of the birds and the beasts. The economist of the laissez-faire school tries to skirt around this philosophical and theological point; yet if hard pressed he must admit that his entire argument is based on the axiom of free will, although he might call it something else. And that axiom certainly is not materialistic; any discussion of it leads ineluctably to a consideration of the soul.

By way of contrast, it is the socialist (whatever sub-species) who must begin his argument with a rejection of the idea of free will. His theory

requires him to describe the individual as purely materialistic in composition. What is called free will, he must maintain, is a batch of reflexes to environmental conditioning. The choices a man makes, whether in the field of culture or material things, are determined by his training and the influences brought to bear on him. Hence, he cannot be held accountable for his behavior. The individual is putty out of which omnipotent government builds the good society, nothing else.

"Hedonism"

Returning to the defamation of individualism, another value-laden word that was, and still is, hurled at it is "hedonism." (At least one modern writer, who maintains that a Christian cannot be an individualist, seems to be championing this nineteenth-century criticism.) The label stems from the fact that a number of self-styled individualists and disciples of Adam Smith associated themselves with an ethical creed known as utilitarianism; the most famous are Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. The basic tenet of this creed is that man is constitutionally driven to avoid pain and to seek pleasure. Hence, in the nature of things, the only morally good conduct is that which favors this pursuit. But, a problem of definition arises, since what is pleasure for a philosopher might be pain for the moron. Bentham, founder of the school, who was more interested in legislation than in philosophy, solved the problem nicely by drawing up a coarse calculus of pleasure; and then he enunciated a principle of legislation based on it: that is morally good which promotes the greatest good for the greatest number.

Coming from an avowed opponent of privilege and an advocate of limited government, this do-gooding doctrine is a strange anomaly. If the moral measure of legislation is the greatest good for the greatest number, it follows that the good of the minority, even a minority of one, is immoral. That would hardly accord with the basic tenet of individualism that man is endowed with rights which the majority may not tamper with. This contradiction bothered Mill (whose essay, *On Liberty*, is high

If labor and capital are free, the flow of each under the law of competition towards an equilibrium is as natural as that of the waters of the ocean under the action of gravitation.

AARON CHAPIN

dogma in the individualist's creed) no end; his doctrine of freedom of thought and expression was hardly consistent with the majoritarianism of Bentham. In this philosophic conflict, his loyalty to his father (Bentham's closest associate) and to Bentham, won out, and in the event he was logically driven to a qualified endorsement of socialism. Without intending to, he demonstrated the incompatibility of utilitarianism and individualism.

Neo-socialists are not all unaware of the fact that utilitarianism plays into their hands. Nevertheless, when discussion gives way to epithet-throwing, individualism is still denounced as "hedonism."

Tenets of Individualism

If individualism is not what its detractors call it, what is it? That is a reasonable question to ask, but a more difficult one to answer, simply because as a pattern of thought it has engaged many minds over the ages, and has thus acquired a number of facets; philosophy knows no "party line." Yet, it is possible and permissible to summarize in a single paragraph the principal tenets of individualism, or those which its modern votaries are in some agreement upon.

Metaphysically, individualism holds that the person is unique, not a sample of the mass, owing his peculiar composition and his allegiance to his Creator, not his environment. Because of his origin and existence, he is endowed with inalienable rights, which it is the duty of all others to respect, even as it is his duty to respect theirs; among these rights are life, liberty and property. Following from this premise, society has no warrant for invading these rights, even under the pretext of improving his circumstances; and government can render him no service other than that of protecting him against his fellow man in the enjoyment of these rights. In the field of economics (with which libertarians are rightly concerned because it is there that government begins its infringement), the government has no competence; and the best it can do is to maintain a condition of order, so that the individual may carry on his business with the assurance that he will keep what he produces. That is all.

Letter from the Continent

The Menace of Boredom

E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Europe's current state of mind is difficult to define. It certainly is not a healthy one.

The years from 1950 to 1953 were the Euramerican honeymoon. The disappointments of 1944-1946 were seemingly overcome and, owing to U.S. aid, a real boom soon developed on the Continent. It would be exaggerating to say that Europe was swept off its feet by a wave of affection and gratitude towards the U.S. But the impressive thing achieved by American aid remained the economic reconstruction. This new wealth created a feeling that life, after all, was worth living, that the new property ought to be defended and that it really did matter whether one belonged to the wealthy West or the impoverished East.

The prosperity continues in all free European countries, but now signs of a curious stagnation and disintegration can be felt everywhere. And this, to a certain extent, includes the USSR. The tension has been so terrific, the hatreds so enormous, the antagonisms so sharp, the intrigues so poisonous, that they simply cannot go on. What is psychologically true of the individual is also true of the larger political units: the mind cannot continue with the same fare, year after year; after a while, even if the enemy remains deadly, there will be a change of position, another plan, another alignment, another set of slogans, another sort of leadership.

As we know from experience, it is neither wealth nor great misery which fosters revolutions. Great misery has a paralyzing effect and no great European revolution was ever started on an entirely empty stomach.

A certain boredom is again with us in Europe. The fronts and frontiers seem to be frozen. Germany will stay divided. Austria will not get the Italian Tyrol. The French Communists are unable to increase the number of their voters. The Franco government is going to stay on. The enslaved nations of Eastern Europe

will not be liberated. All real troubles occur outside the Continent of Europe—in Algeria, the Near East, Singapore, Cyprus, and the Sudan.

Yet Europe is uneasy in the fat of its prosperity. And a subtle revolt is taking place, a revolt coming from the part of the population which usually leads the opposition against complacency—the youth.

The German (and Continental) political life consists of huge masses of apathetic citizens, voting in a strangely ordered and peaceful fashion—and very tiny, very private, very active associations and groups forming crystallization points for future political movements. On the Continent it is always the youth and the intellectuals who start the political ball rolling.

As yet, the fat European patient is hardly aware that he suffers. Europe feels like an old tramp who has suddenly been confined to a good upper-middle-class resort with no exit. Some of the young people take this life for granted; others rebel against it; and the older ones among us have the subconscious feeling that all this can not go on forever. We are aware of the abyss which opens just a few miles east of Vienna.

One term is constantly turning up in many a European periodical—*restoration*. And indeed, we are in a restoration period analogous to that after 1815—with the difference that not the Bourbons but the pre-1933 democrats have been restored with the help of Allied bayonets.

Many of us listen in the evening to strange voices and songs coming on short-wave across the Mediterranean. There is something menacing in these wailing and screaming sounds which must have been familiar to our ancestors who defended Europe against the Moslems. And meanwhile, wedged in between the Sahara and Siberia, still-free Europe gets every day fatter—and every day more nervous and less sure of itself.

THE IVORY TOWER

WM. F. BUCKLEY, JR.

The Compleat Litt. D.

Two springs ago, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg sent a letter to the president of every American college and university volunteering, on a first-come-first-served basis, to deliver the baccalaureate address at the forthcoming commencement exercises. Putting all his cards on the table, Mr. Kohlberg enclosed a copy of the address he was prepared to deliver. It was a stirring peroration on our lost freedoms. A bit of a caricature, the reader got the impression as he made his way, through torrid prose, down the lengthy list of freedoms lost and persecutions instituted; but Mr. Kohlberg was prepared for that one too. After every phrase that described direly or flamboyantly the national plight, he affixed a tiny little number, in the best academic tradition. And at the end of the speech, each such phrase was identified—all of them having actually been spoken or written by eminent Liberals.

What Mr. Kohlberg had done was to write a composite address, so to speak, incorporating a sampling of the collected complaints of Elmer Davis, Henry Steele Commager, Robert Hutchins, Zechariah Chafee, and other professional ululators. The effect was devastating.

Mr. Kohlberg was having fun, of course (and who would deny him that freedom?). But the academic community most definitely did not see the joke. For the Composite Speech was frighteningly like the one that had actually been delivered the year before, at College X, and was to be delivered again this year, at College Y, and will, *mutatis mutandis*, be delivered again next year, at College Z. Nothing is more horrifying to self-styled stalwarts of individualism than the mirror which, angled in just the right way—the way Alfred Kohlberg angled it—throws back at them the dismal image of their own drab conformism.

This week, and next, are the weeks for the passing around of academic honors, at ceremonies around the land.

Most honorary degrees are conferred, appropriately, upon industrious scholars whose labors go unremarked and unappreciated except by limited audi-

From Mr. Kohlberg's Proposed Address

... we have given license to traveling troupes of congressional inquisitors to pry into the lives, the morals, the thoughts and the beliefs of scholars, teachers, writers and ministers, to detect whether they may not have had in the distant past, some unorthodox thought, or some wrong or non-conformist belief.¹ The Bill of Rights is besieged, ancient liberties infringed, reckless words uttered, vigilante groups are formed, . . . and the specter of a political police emerges.² This is the Black Silence of Fear.³ Education is impossible in many parts of the United States today because free inquiry and free discussion are impossible.⁴ Our present-day wrecking-crew may knock out one of the props of our democratic system—the right of petition. After all, if a petition for clemency for the Rosenbergs, for example, or for the abolition of the Un-American Activities Committee is to expose men and women to investigation, to the charge of subversion, they will think twice before signing anything.⁵ The contagion of meanness growing from hysterical fear of Communism at home is being spread to the very shield of the republic, our foreign policy.⁶ Witch hunters are on the loose again, . . . armed with subpoenas and the cruel whiplash of unevaluated gossip.⁷

(1-Lehman; 2-Stevenson; 3-Douglas; 4-Hutchins; 5-Commager; 6-Harriman; 7-Truman)

ences. These are the men and women at work in abstract disciplines who probe new worlds of science and letters, who never get a Nobel Prize or a visit by Edward R. Murrow. The day is theirs primarily, and legitimately so.

Kudos

But the custom now is to lace the event with a strong dose of men of affairs; not, alas, of the unobjectionable kind who merely drink Calvert Whisky, but with men of political moment, writers, lawyers, diplomats, industrialists. The prototype of that group, who receives a doctorate several times a year, is Paul G. Hoffman who, in myriad academic citations, has been likened to everything from the aurora borealis to the setting sun. Sometimes Mr. Hoffman will make a speech, sometimes not. If it is a small college, they get a speech out of it, a speech about the challenge of the future (foreign aid), or about the perils of the present (McCarthyism), or both.

Mr. Kohlberg, by suggesting that a conformity of sorts grips the colleges, was accurately zeroed in. I, for one, cannot recall a genuinely audacious or humane conferral of an honorary degree by a major university in this country in recent years. The major institutions of higher learning that lined up to honor Paul Hoffman never invited Robert Taft to accept a degree. Those that paid tribute to Eleanor Roosevelt have not sought out Madame Chiang Kai-shek. They go after Agnes Meyer, not Rebecca West; Henry Luce, not David Lawrence. George Marshall, not Douglas MacArthur, was lionized by the colleges after the war; Chester Bowles and Harold Stassen, not Charles Lindbergh, or Bracken Lee; George Kennan, not James Burnham, is the order of the day. This is the age of Edward R. Murrow, not of Whittaker Chambers.

The paths to academic recognition are well lighted. They lead, also, to barren materialism, and dull compliance with the demands of the Establishment. That is why, this week, so many young eyes will stray, and minds wander, from the platforms where the exertions of our most conspicuous Philistines will, in orotund language, be forever memorialized.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

FDR: Double-Talking Quarterback

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

The New Deal chopped and changed so often in its direction that it frequently appeared to cancel itself. Between its NRA and TNEC phases there was no visible economic connection, if the spending of money be excepted; and with such antipodal prophets as Hugh Johnson and Thurman Arnold clamoring for the President's ear it often seemed as though the Tower of Babel had been substituted for the Washington Monument.

With the steed riding off to all points on the horizon, it is small wonder, then, that commentators and biographers have been at a chronic loss to penetrate to the secret, if any, of Franklin D. Roosevelt's economic philosophy. Did he have basic economic predilections?

His own metaphorical conception of himself (as the quarterback always willing to change the play) seemed to argue the complete pragmatist. But, where Herbert Hoover thought of him as "that man," Benjamin Cohen and Jerome Frank, though willing to concede the "skipper's" ability to veer and tack, always suspected the President of a deep and abiding hankering for a balanced budget. Rexford Tugwell often wondered audibly at the "internationalism" that kept popping out even when FDR was giving his assent to measures of dogmatically nationalist control. And Raymond Moley and Cordell Hull went to the London Economic Conference in 1933 with contradictory plans in their pockets, each assured that his own plan had the unequivocal White House blessing.

Truly, the historian who would discern the presence of a steadfast North Star in the New Deal economic firmament has his work cut out for him, and it is hardly a criticism of Professor Daniel R. Fusfeld's *The Economic Thought of Franklin R. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal* (Columbia, \$5) that it trails off into such indefinite sentences as "Although it is difficult to estimate just what Roosevelt took from his Harvard courses . . . the courses themselves were part of that intellectual-political ferment that was leading to Progressivism."

Professor Fusfeld, who teaches at Hofstra College, is the first person to my knowledge to have gone deeply into the subject of FDR's schooling at Groton and Harvard. Roose-

velt took a course in political economy at Groton where he may have learned something about the theories of Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. At Harvard he studied "the classical triad of production, distribution and exchange" under A. Piatt Andrew in the basic introductory course, and went on to take a full economics major in his fourth year. Since he had qualified for his degree at the end of three years, the fourth year counted as graduate work.

Whether the young Roosevelt absorbed the teaching at the time is a conjectural matter, but he was nonetheless exposed to good men in a number of interesting courses. He had Professor William Z. Ripley in the Economics of Transportation and the Economics of Corporations, Professor Oliver M. Sprague in Banking, Piatt Andrew in Money, and the famous Frederick J. Turner in a course on the Development of the West.

All of Roosevelt's teachers were

advocates of economic reform, of government regulation of natural monopolies to avoid abuses; but none of them believed that government should take an active role in directing economic activities. Nor were they Welfare Statists. Ripley was against "extravagant promotions," payment of unearned dividends, speculative management and overcapitalization; he was also a critic of trusts and pools. Andrew taught the Quantity Theory of Money, and Sprague believed in the virtues of a strong central bank. There was little in all this that Herbert Hoover would not have seconded if he had gone to Harvard instead of to Leland Stanford on the West Coast.

Professor Fusfeld thinks that at least some part of the idea of the "regulative state" may have come into the New Deal through Ripley, Sprague and Andrew. Certainly the "mature economy" theory is implicit in Turner's writings on the significance of the frontier. But what Fusfeld cannot prove is that Roosevelt carried anything from the Harvard of 1903 to the New Deal of 1933. Says Professor Fusfeld: "Comments he may have made about [his teachers] at the time have not been preserved, for the most part because his mother had taken a house in Boston to be near her son and there were no letters home. Although in later life Roosevelt made a few comments about Harvard, he seldom mentioned the courses he had."

An honest man, Professor Fusfeld has thus to admit that his long and earnest search into Roosevelt's life as a student has resulted in a most meager harvest of provable influence. He does better, however, when he comes to the subject of Roosevelt's experiences in business in the early and middle twenties. The significant thing about this period in Roosevelt's life is his connection with the trade association movement that ultimately spawned the NRA.

Curiously enough, Roosevelt worked

very closely with Herbert Hoover in the twenties. "Together," says Professor Fusfeld, "they decided to form the American Construction Council" as a trade association designed to stabilize the chaotic construction industry. The idea was to have the industry police itself. When the editor of the *Manufacturer's Record* wrote to Roosevelt that "for an organization such as yours to urge that no new work should be begun for 90 days is merely a strike of capital against labor and materials," he got a typical FDR answer: "Yours is a creed of 'every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost.'"

Neither Hoover nor Roosevelt felt at the time that trade associations might develop the sort of restrictionism that was later typified by the NRA codes. But, unlike Roosevelt, Hoover had a clear idea of things to avoid when practicing "self-government" in industry. When the "Swope Plan" was evolved in 1931, Hoover saw through it at once. "This plan," he said, "provides for the consolidation of all industries into trade associations . . . authorized to 'stabilize prices.' There is no stabilization of prices without price-fixing, and this feature at once becomes the organization of gigantic trusts such as have never been dreamed of in the history of the world. . . . It means the repeal of the entire Sherman and Clayton Acts, and all other restrictions on combinations and monopoly." Roosevelt, on the other hand, was inclined to speak favorably in 1931 of "planning," and when the time came he accepted the Swope Plan as the basis of the NRA.

Somewhere along the line Roosevelt developed disbelief in the classical Say's Law—the law which argues that production creates its own purchasing power. The idea that underconsumption was endemic in the capitalist system was very much in the air in the late twenties and early thirties, and Roosevelt was as impressionable as the next man. Indeed, the Rooseveltian ability to snatch things from the air was so pronounced that one wonders about the validity of Fusfeld's title, which dignifies Roosevelt's economics with the word "thought." The truth is that Roosevelt never applied logical analysis to economics: he had feelings

of sympathy and a distorted *noblesse oblige*, and he acted on his feelings in a more or less spontaneous way.

Roosevelt saw, accurately enough, that people were in trouble in the Depression. But from this he jumped blindly to the notion that a state can be "positive" by applying a mixture of welfare legislation, agricultural restrictionism, high prices, aid to debtors, and liberal advancement of credit to home owners, farmers and businessmen. The use of the word "positive" in this connection betokens a confusion of economics and physics, to which the lingo of electrical energy is properly germane. Roosevelt never explained to himself how a "positive state" could be maintained without taking equal and opposite "negative" action against individuals by robbing them through inflation and high taxes.

In brief, Roosevelt's exposure to economics as such didn't take. It got mixed up with physics, and ran off into double-talk. Fusfeld implies as much when he asks a leading question: "Is the 'positive state' a temporary stopping place on the road to socialism, or is it a true alternative?" But, having asked the crucial question, Fusfeld, like Jestling Pilate, does not pause for an answer. He just signs off.

"A" for Failure

A History of the English-Speaking Peoples: Vol. I. The Birth of Britain, by Winston S. Churchill. 521 pp. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company. \$6.00

By the standards of contemporary academic historiography, this first volume of Churchill's history would undoubtedly fail every test. But by its very existence it gives the lie to those standards. It has literally nothing that could get its writer past any Ph.D. examining board in the land. There is no sign of new research—no sign of any research—no concentration upon social and economic factors, no "use of the new techniques of the social sciences." It is just a story, but what a magnificent story it is. Greater histories of England have been written, but none, I think, approaches this one in verve, in its surging power of narration, in its

creation of compelling images of individual men in historic action.

The implicit theme of this old-fashioned historian is that history is made by individual men. I say implicit, because the explicit theme is "this Island Race"—its birth and growth. And perhaps it is wrong to call this understanding of the individual in history a theme, in any case. It is not so much that as an omnipresent, underlying assumption, so much a part of his view of the world and of history that he could not write in any other terms. He cannot even speculate about the very prehistoric beginnings of his story without creating individual images:

As we gaze back into the mists of time we can very faintly discern the men of the Old Stone Age, and the New Stone Age; the builders of the great megalithic monuments; the newcomers from the Rhineland, with their beakers and tools of bronze. Standing on a grassy down where Dover now is, and pointing to the valley at his feet, one of them might have said to his grandson, "the sea comes farther up that creek than it did when I was a boy," and the grandson might have lived to watch a floodtide, a roaring swirl of white water, sweeping the valley from end to end, carving its grassy sides into steep chalk edges, and linking the North Sea with the Channel.

But, powerful as are the sketches and portraits of individuals which crowd the story, it is the story itself which dominates. Integral to the jostling sequence of battle and intrigue, a pattern is steadily developed, without moralizing, without heavy emphasis, of the early beginnings and slow growth of free institutions—the common law, the jury system, the Parliament.

It is history in the grand style. This is not, I think, as many reviewers have maintained, an effect Churchill has been able to achieve simply because of his own experience in a great historical moment. It is a possibility open to any historian of imagination who is willing to reject the arid formulas which would drive the individual from the pages of history. Indeed, if anything, the book suffers rather than gains from the exigencies of the public life of its author. It is stylistically uneven. It reads, in fact, in spots, as though it had been dictated in a rush and never revised. It might, one is sure, have been a much

greater book, given time and leisure.

Just as it is, however, its over-all effect is tremendous. From the invasion of Julius Caesar to the triumph of Henry Tudor on Bosworth Field, the pace and tension of this first volume never flag. One can only conclude by urging the publishers to make the remaining three volumes available soon.

FRANK S. MEYER

Fair Demolition Job

Native Stone, by Edwin Gilbert. 469 pp. New York: Doubleday and Company. \$4.95

Mr. Gilbert adds only one new ingredient to the familiar "Liberal" novel: architecture. For the rest, he sticks to the tested and approved formula of prejudice and sex, nicely laced with "advanced" political ideas.

The book springs from Yale, out of "Weir-d" Hall, and concerns a number of young architects and the women in their lives, especially half-Irish, half-Jewish Rafferty Bloom and the rebellious Boston blueblood, Troy Austin. The architectural theme, which runs throughout, is handled with flair and feeling; but the characters fail to make good the author's assurance that "their actions or words are not intended in any way to comment or reflect on . . . the places, institutions, or persons [mentioned in this book]." A minor but unpleasant character is introduced for no discernible reason except that she "whined for the home town of Huntsville, Alabama." Her equally unnecessary but more congenial husband "went home to Alabama but couldn't stand it any more. Too many Southerners down there. . ." And then: "The hunting-riding-lynching set down there [West Virginia, this time] is something you can get your teeth into, Troy." For something "not intended," that does a fair demolition job on the South.

Troy Austin—vulgar, oversexed, over-Liberal, but with "fine eyes," a "soft genteel voice," and a "peculiar healthy honesty"—manages to dominate the book and isn't at all inhibited by the author's denial of intentions—or, for that matter, by anything else. With the back of her hand to "stodgy" Republicans, she leads us down the garden path to True Liberalism; and since we know she is going to emerge

as a noble character, we mustn't be reactionary or chauvinistic about being led. Whenever she can get her mind off sex (and *why* must writers who knock themselves out trying to be clever and subtle about other things always be so blatant and explicit about sex?), she is crusading for some Liberal cause, reading the *New Republic*, or working up a white-hot lather over discrimination, distrust between the U.S. and the USSR, or the latest grievance of the National Association for Advancement of Colored People. And so it goes, intentionally or not.

This long, big book should satisfy all those with an avid appetite for architecture, sex and a better-managed world. As for others, particularly Southerners and conservatives, a rebuke awaits them, whether, "intended" or not.

FRANCES BECK

Safe for a While

The Future of the Book, edited by Lester Asheim. 105 pp. Chicago: University of Chicago Graduate Library School. \$3.75

The future of the book, along with that of many other things in a world that is cheerfully or apprehensively described as "fast changing" is now being called into question. A means of record and an instrument of education which has stood unchallenged for thousands of years finds itself competing today with films, tapes, discs, the radio, the television screen, and other products of technology. To librarians, as custodians of the book, this is a development of special concern, and last year the Library School of the University of Chicago held a conference in order to take stock of changes and assess the book's future.

There is nothing in the findings of the men represented here, who come from a number of professions and fields of learning, to inspire alarm in the breast of the book-lover. For the verdict is practically unanimous that the book has a long lease on life, perhaps not as a handsome artifact, but certainly as a means for the storage and transmission of knowledge. Its new competitors, though they may dazzle with some feature of novelty or ingenuity, prove to have limitations of their own. And the physical

changes in book manufacture, which cause some to feel that the book is on the way out, are hardly greater than those in the past from papyrus scroll to vellum codex, and so on. Professor Howard W. Winger summed up the sense of the meeting when he said: "In providing for the storage of information and for its efficient retrieval, the codex book has been without a peer. It can hold more and yield it more readily than any other tool that has been devised up to now."

The real threat appears to come not so much from the new means of transcribing and reproducing as from the fact that the book is overmultiplying itself. It is a saying among professional librarians that the modern library, like money at compound interest, doubles every sixteen years. Although certain leveling-off forces prevent the actual increase from being quite that terrifying, storage is in most places an acute problem. For the same reason, reference grows increasingly complicated. A student becoming familiar with a field needs to find his way now not among a few books, but among hundreds or thousands, so that "the sheer bulk of recorded information is today a cause of serious concern." Our methods of getting at the contents of books are lagging behind book publication. It is a fact that mathematicians are at work trying to devise more adequate means for classifying and retrieving the information piling up in libraries.

The question of the future seems to be not whether the book will be used, but how it can be coded, arranged, and recovered in libraries that will contain millions of volumes.

RICHARD M. WEAVER

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A Call to Action!

WE, THE PEOPLE!

Nominations Are Now in Order

ARE YOU ONE of the Americans who are highly incensed at the way our Federal Government has been infiltrated and nearly taken over by left-wing forces working toward national socialism and World Government? Most of our elected and appointed officials today go along with the scheme in order to keep their jobs. And the pressure groups drive them on!

We can save our heritage of freedom in America only through a movement to regain constitutionally limited government and states rights. Do you agree that we, the people, must take immediate action at the state and local levels to protect our American heritage?

ACTION COMMITTEES must be formed this year in every county and community by the patriotic citizens of their states. Whom would you nominate for the Action Committee of your state? Will you volunteer to serve on the Action Committee of your county or community? Here is our program:

1. To organize a voting bloc of loyal, patriotic Americans, who will place country before party, to offset pressure of the left-wing groups.
2. To elect representatives this year who will preserve our national independence, our states rights and the freedom and dignity of the individual.
3. To secure the help of state legislatures to limit the taxing and spending power of the Federal Government.
4. To support amendments to restore limited constitutional government to safeguard our economic future and that of coming generations.

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☐ I want to be come an affiliate of WE, THE PEOPLE! and enclose my 1956 contribution of \$....., which will cover my 12 months subscription to our patriotic newspaper, FREE ENTERPRISE, (\$3.00 per year). Please acknowledge and send my 1956 membership card in WE, THE PEOPLE!

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To the Editor

Princeton Undergraduates

In the issue of May 30 you comment editorially on the ambivalence . . . in the attitude of Princeton University toward the speech by Alger Hiss and its attitude toward the attempt by Manpower, Inc. . . . to employ fifty undergraduates . . . as deliverymen of Lincoln-Mercury automobiles. . . . In fairness to the University . . . undergraduates enrolled at Princeton are not permitted, except by special dispensation, either to maintain or to operate a motor vehicle while the college is in session.

STEPHEN H. PATTERSON, JR.

Princeton, N.J.

Mr. Lippmann Appreciated

In your issue of May 2, Walter Lippmann was called unfriendly names.

Over the last twenty-five years Lippmann's writings have been quoted at length and often discussed in a rather friendly manner. . . . He has been referred to as a "responsible," "serious," "important," "thoughtful," "distinguished," etc., writer. Utter drivel he has written about postwar Russia and European relations has been apparently appreciated.

Where was all this? In *Pravda* and other Soviet publications.

New York City

E. ANDREEVICH

Amuses—and Angers

NATIONAL REVIEW continues to interest, amuse, and anger me, and what more can I ask of a magazine? I don't get this reaction from any other journal these days.

Ithaca, N.Y.

CLINTON ROSSITER

The Tito Bait


The following is taken from a famous letter written in July 1951 by Robert H. W. Welch, Jr., entitled "May God Forgive Us." I quote:

"We are swallowing the Tito bait, hook, line and sinker. We are pouring huge quantities of war material and of our newest armament into the hands of the Communists to be used against us. I am aware that few of our readers will believe me, for the deception has been too cleverly planned and too realistically executed. . . ."

Larchmont, N.Y.

RICHARD GAINES

AN *Important*
MESSAGE
TO INDUSTRY



KENNAMETAL'S* high quality is attained by quality control that starts with the ores

After a carbide material has been sintered into a hard, strong metal, it is too late to worry about quality. The quality of a sintered carbide is no higher than the quality of its metal.


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In the absence of a Gold Standard during the past two decades, the great savings made possible by Kennametal have evaporated in helping hold down the rate of inflation. Thus, you and your fellow men have not been able to enjoy "the fruits" of industrial ingenuity in the form of lower prices. Perhaps this suggests the need for the re-establishment of a Gold Coin Standard. At least, it is a subject for serious discussion with friends, neighbors, public officials and candidates for office, particularly since this is an election year.



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